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       Abstract—The present study undertakes an ecological 
approach to haptic interfaces grounded in the sense of agency 
that accompanies human action. The study had two aims. The 
first aim was to investigate the effect of two top-down cues 
(perceived initiation of action and presence of action options) on 
sense of agency in haptic interfaces. The second aim was to 
investigate the consistency of the sense of agency and answer the 
question whether consistent force feedback (bottom-up cue) is 
sufficient to grant stable experience of agency. The results of the 
study suggest that while high number of action options can be 
associated with stronger agency, low numbers of action options 
are unlikely to produce such effect, and that the cue of task 
completion might be critical for the sense of agency. The study 
also showed that sense of agency was relatively inconsistent, with 
the main source of uncertainty being computer-attributed 
agency. The discussion addresses issues of joint human-computer 
agency and the contribution of multiple sources of information to 
agency experience.  
Keywords—sense of agency, motion control, joint human-
computer action  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
A. Haptic Interfaces 
Haptic human-computer interfaces offer a qualitatively new 
way of interacting with virtual environments. They have 
already become an indispensable learning means in some 
domains and a valuable tool for clinical practice. In the 
learning context, haptic interfaces have been primarily 
developed for surgery simulation and training [1, 2, 3], and 
driving simulation [4]. In the context of clinical practice, haptic 
interfaces are being developed for the therapeutic force 
feedback distortion for patients with motor restraints [5]. Due 
to the virtue of remote control, haptic systems have also found 
an application in motor rehabilitation that allows distant 
interaction with the therapist. In the case of such distant 
rehabilitation (telerehabilitation), the patient can sit in the 
haptic workstation and the therapist can remotely interact with 
the patient by giving instructions, controlling the exerted 
forces, and modifying other elements of the environment in 
real time, thereby driving the motor behavior of the patient in a 
way beneficial to the motor system [6]. 
Diversity in the application domains, functions, and 
interaction styles accounts for the large variety of haptic 
interfaces. The force feedback can be provided to the hand (see 
[7], for review), upper body (e.g., [6]), or lower body (e.g., 
[8]). Such feedback in some cases supports the possibility of 
distant interaction with real environment through teleoperation. 
In other cases, the design aids interaction with virtual reality 
exclusively, enabling the perception of shape and substance 
properties of virtual objects. Virtual haptically rendered objects 
and surfaces can be experienced as having a variety of 
properties including weight [9, 10], roughness [11, 12], and 
compliance [13] that conveys the related experiences of 
stiffness [14] and softness [15, 16, 17].  
In essence, haptic human-computer interfaces are based on 
human ability to process force feedback provided by the haptic 
device; therefore, the design of the interface is innately linked 
to the limitations of vibrotactile stimuli processing by the 
human sensorimotor system. Such limitations of the human 
sensorimotor system are quite variable and depend on body 
part the measurement is taken from (e.g., differences in 
vibrotactile thresholds for wrist, elbow, and shoulder in [18]), 
rate of change of the stimulus [19], complexity of the generated 
movement [18], electrical and mechanical specifications of the 
device [20], and other factors. Considering that the detection 
limitations of the human sensorimotor system depend on 
multiple internal and external factors, in some cases it is 
possible to use generic knowledge about vibrotactile thresholds 
that represent such limitations of the sensorimotor processing; 
however, in most cases, a customized measure of the 
thresholds that allows testing the limitations for a specific type 
of setup or stimulus is employed. The measurement of the 
vibrotactile thresholds typically takes a form of explicit 
judgment of force differences (JND – just noticeable 
difference) [18, 21] and the obtained JND information is 
consequently used to render haptic stimuli and set the limits in 
the haptic system.  
While vibrotactile thresholds are informative in general, the 
present study argues that threshold measurement can serve only 
as initial stage in rendering of haptic stimuli and that more 
complex experiential testing of haptic environment stimuli is 
necessary on the consequent stages of haptic interface design. 
This argument is based on the assumption that the performance 
on the threshold measurement tasks cannot be projected to the 
performance in haptic environment that has a task different 
from that of vibrotactile force feedback judgment. Such 
projection cannot be made because we normally do not 
explicitly evaluate the amount of experienced force, but rather 
sensorimotor feedback becomes implicitly interpreted through 
complex experience of sense of agency that relies on 
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With regard to such ecological reasoning, the evaluation of 
JND is not representative of the force feedback perception in 
an actual haptic environment, and an efficient environment 
needs to be grounded in the human experience of agency 
characteristic to real interaction. The following section reviews 
the notion of the sense of agency and outlines the factors that 
determine the experience with haptically rendered stimuli. 
B. Sense of Agency 
Sense of agency is an experience of control of own action 
that involves the perception of correspondence between 
intention and action and a causal attribution of the outcome of 
action to self. Sense of agency has been labeled “one of the 
most pervasive aspects of human consciousness” [22, p. 1]. A 
vastly supported account of the sense of agency indicates that 
agency depends on the bottom-up internal cues which pertain 
to motoric signal analysis and top-down cues which are quite 
diverse in nature and may include beliefs, task-related thoughts 
and expectations as well as external situational cues [23, 24, 
25, 26]. The role of bottom-up cues in sense of agency has 
been explained well on the basis of the internal forward model 
that presumes the existence of two types of internal prediction 
mechanisms: the prediction of the outcome of the motor 
command and the prediction of the sensory consequences of 
movement. It was proposed [27] that three types of internal 
comparisons that employ these prediction mechanisms account 
for the normal experience of agency: 1) the comparison 
between predicted outcome and desired state of the motor 
system; 2) the comparison between the predicted sensory 
consequences and actual state; 3) the comparison between the 
desired state and the actual state. The model also postulates that 
only some internal representations are available to conscious 
awareness. For example, there seems to be limited awareness 
of the actual state of the motor system, but we are normally 
aware of the predicted consequences of movement. At the same 
time, as long as the desired state is achieved, we seem to be 
unaware of the results of the comparison between predicted 
outcome and desired outcome of the motor command [27]. 
Such comparator model that postulates that normal sense of 
agency is a result of the processes of comparison of 
representations that involve sensorimotor feedback and are 
partially outside our awareness has been used to explain a 
range of abnormal agency phenomena (e.g., delusions of 
control, anarchic hand sign); however, limitations of the 
explanatory power of the model have also been noted (see [28], 
for review). 
The role of top-down cues in sense of agency is understood 
less and no coherent theory exists up to date to explain at full 
how the top-down cues and the bottom-up cues are combined. 
This is partially due to the diversity of the top-down cues and 
the difference between the cues with regard to the time course 
of the action. Some are linked in time to action selection and 
generation others occur prior or after the action has been 
executed. Cognitive load, for example, could be considered a 
time-linked cue: as the performance on the task generates 
cognitive load, the cognitive load determines in an online 
manner the experience of agency in a target task.  It was 
recently shown in [29] that sense of agency depends on 
cognitive load with greater working memory load being 
associated with lower ratings of agency. 
A number of studies have shown that information prior to 
action can also influence the sense of agency. Most notably 
studies point to the effect of both subliminal and supraliminal 
priming on agency. In [30] participants were primed with 
words “left” and “right”; the priming stage was followed by 
left or right button presses that generated the tone. The results 
showed lower agency in incompatible primes. In [31] left- and 
right-pointing arrows were used to prime left and right index 
finger response. The results confirmed that sense of agency can 
be enhanced by compatible primes. Other studies have also 
shown the effect of priming on the sense of agency (e.g., [32]). 
Finally, post hoc cognitive processing has been shown to 
influence the sense of agency as well. As an example, [33] 
describe a probable situation in which a golf player hits the ball 
and the trajectory of the ball is changed due to the wind which 
causes the ball to actually fall into the hole. In this case, the 
golf player might attribute the success to self even though the 
predicted flight trajectory was not expected to produce this 
result. Such attribution would be based on the positive 
evaluation of the action outcome. Such possibility has been 
proven experimentally as well. In [33] participants’ movement 
was paired with pictures of positive, neutral, and negative 
affective content taken from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS). The results showed that the affective valence 
of the movement outcome influenced the judgment of the 
direction of movement by the participants with the movement 
being perceived as directed towards positive outcome and away 
from negative outcome. 
Not only can top-down cues influence the sense of agency, 
but in cases when bottom-up cues are unavailable, top-down 
cues alone seem to be sufficient to grant the sense of agency. 
For example, [34] note that in daily life we, in fact, encounter 
situations when bottom-up cues are unavailable but the agency 
is still experienced due to beliefs and situational cues. For 
example, we might not remember performing an action due to 
its automatic nature, however, we would still experience 
agency over it because there might not be a better explanation 
of the event other than self-caused. What is even more 
interesting is that on the basis of top-down cues alone we can 
experience an absolutely illusory agency that pertains to the 
action that has not been performed by self at all. In [35] using a 
two-person paradigm that involved observing movements of 
hands of a different person positioned in a location of own 
hands, was shown that participants would report a greater sense 
of control over the movement of hands if the instruction 
pertaining to the movement was given prior to movement as 
opposed to after the movement, and if the instruction was 
congruent with movements as opposed to non-congruent. The 
study pointed to the role of anticipation of specific movement 
in the sense of agency experience. There are even more radical 
examples of the illusory agency on the basis of thoughts. It was 
shown in [36] that having thoughts about the event prior to it 
can create a sense of agency even though the causation itself 
would be quite “magical”. For example, participants were more 
likely to believe that they inflicted harm to another person via a 
voodoo curse if they had thoughts about the event consistent 
with the harm. In a basketball game setting, participants were 
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also more likely to perceive their causal role in the game 
performance if they had prior visualizations of success. Such 
“magical” agency is also based on top-down cues exclusively 
and is grounded in belief. 
II. PRESENT APPROACH 
The present research builds on the argument that while for 
the purpose of haptic stimuli rendering participants are asked to 
explicitly evaluate the amount of experienced force, in the 
daily life we never explicitly evaluate sensorimotor feedback; 
such feedback becomes implicitly interpreted and coupled with 
other sources of information within the complex experience of 
agency that allows us to feel control over our actions. The 
implications of the discrepancy between the force evaluation in 
the context of haptic application design and real life experience 
would be in that the threshold measurements would not be 
representative of how the force feedback is perceived through 
the sense of agency during the performance on the tasks that 
are different from the task of force feedback evaluation. 
Accordingly, the present study has two aims.  
First, taking into account the findings of the interaction 
between top-down cues and bottom-up cues, the aim is to 
investigate the sense of agency under consistent force feedback 
(bottom-up cue) while manipulating top-down cues of 1) 
perception of action options and 2) experience of initiation of 
action as opposed to continuation of action. The research on the 
above top-down cues is quite scarce and to our knowledge, up-
to-date there has been only one study investigating the 
contribution of the action options to the sense of agency. In this 
sole study [22] that combined key pressing and tone 
presentation, participants were given one key to press, three 
keys to choose from and press, or seven keys. The results 
showed that the maximum number of alternatives was 
associated with the strongest degree of intentional binding. 
Intentional binding is a phenomenon of experienced time 
compression between an action and its perceived causal 
outcome in case of attribution of causal outcome to self. 
Intentional binding has been used as a reliable implicit measure 
of agency; hence, higher intentional binding in [22] is an 
indicator of the stronger sense of agency.  
The second aim of the present study is to investigate 
consistency of agency judgment and answer the question 
whether consistent force feedback (bottom-up cue) is sufficient 
to grant stable experience of agency. This aim is grounded in 
the idea that human perceptual system should be evaluated in 
terms of stability and that such evaluation is particularly 
relevant to the contexts that deviate from common real-life 
experiences. Stability in haptic systems has so far been 
addressed systematically from technology-centered 
perspective. For example, it has been pointed out the fact that 
unlike other types of displays, haptic displays are 
fundamentally different as they involve bi-directional flow of 
physical energy and that “the human grasp may stabilize an 
otherwise unstable system by absorbing mechanical energy. 
Conversely, the human grasp may destabilize an otherwise 
stable system by reflecting energy back into the system. Since 
the haptic device actively generates physical energy, 
instabilities can damage hardware and even pose a physical 
threat to the human” [37, p. 465]. While the technology-
centered perspective on stability is crucial, what is also true 
that human interaction with the haptic displays (e.g., human 
grasp that can destabilize the system in [37]) is based on the 
online perception, and the human perceptual system also has 
properties of noise and instability. The question of the joint 
stability of the human perceptual system and haptic hardware is 
beyond the scope of the current research and presents an area 
for future investigation. The present study intends to measure 
only the consistency of the sense of agency of human operator 




Sixteen undergraduate students from the American 
University of Beirut took part in the study. All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and did not report any 
sensory or motor impairment in the dominant hand. The study 
was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the 
American University of Beirut.  
2) Task instructions and stimuli 
Participants were seated in front of the 15" computer screen 
that depicted a set of dots with assigned numbers. The task 
given to the participants was to connect the dots according to 
their numbers in a regular ascending sequence. The visual 
stimuli were two-dimensional, and the completion of the task 
required interaction with the display by the means of SensAble 
PHANTOM OMNI® haptic device. PHANTOM OMNI® 
haptic device is a system with 6 degrees of freedom and 
maximum exertable force of 3.3 N. The force feedback is 
provided on x, y and z planes. The device allows tactile 
interaction with virtual objects by employing the force and 
vibration feedback.  
First, the participants had to place the stylus of the 
PHANTOM OMNI® haptic device in space in a way that the 
indicator of the spatial location of the tip of the stylus on the 
screen pointed at the first dot. Once the spatial location of the 
tip of the stylus was identified on the screen and the indicator 
placed at the target, the participants had to press the button on 
the stylus and move the stylus to the next dot in a sequence 
until all the dots were connected. As the participants moved 
from one dot to another, a line linking the dots appeared on the 
screen to indicate the connected sequence. Such visual 
indication of the connection ensured a clear experience of 
connecting the dots rather than moving in space from one 
location to another. 
3) Task conditions 
Two types of dot sequencing were designed in the present 
study. Type I sequencing consisted of two tasks and type II 
sequencing consisted of six tasks, allowing the manipulation of 
the target top-down cues: 1) presence of action options and 2) 
perceived initiation of action (see Figure 1 for sample tasks). 
Two types of sequencing as opposed to one were used to 
ensure that the possible effect is unrelated to the sequence itself 
but rather to the manipulated variables. The cue of the presence 
of action options was manipulated by adding two dots with the  
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same number equidistantly from the preceding dot resulting in 
an ambiguous situation where it is nonapparent to the 
participant which dot to connect next. The manipulation of the 
presence of action options cue resulted in two task conditions: 
1) decision condition in which participants had to make a 
choice between two equally valid action options as two dots 
had the same number; 2) non-decision condition in which each 
dot had a unique number, and therefore, the necessary 
sequence of connection was unambiguous. The cue of 
perceived initiation of action was manipulated by creating tasks 
that were done jointly with the computer. The manipulation of 
the perceived initiation of action cue resulted in two task 
conditions: 1) initiation of action condition which represents a 
situation where the participant starts from dot with the number 
1 and connects the rest of the dots according to their numbers, 
2) continuation of action condition which represents a situation 
where the computer starts connecting the dots from dot 1 and 
the participant continues once the computer reaches a target red 
dot with the number 6. Computer’s connection of the dots took 



























appeared between the dots. Regardless of the condition, 
participants connected six dots in all type I and type II tasks.  
The experimental stage which followed the familiarization 
and practice stage consisted of 40 randomized trials: five trials 
of each of the eight tasks. The eight tasks with regard to 
sequencing and manipulated cues are following: task 1: type I 
sequencing non-decision/initiation of action; task 2: type I 
sequencing non-decision/continuation of action; task 3: type II 
sequencing decision/initiation of action; task 4: type II 
sequencing non-decision left/initiation of action; task 5: type II 
sequencing non-decision right/initiation of action; task 6: type 
II sequencing decision/continuation of action; task 7: type II 
sequencing non-decision right/continuation of action; task 8: 
type II sequencing non-decision left/continuation of action. 
Note that the difference in the number of tasks in type I 
sequencing and type II sequencing is due to the nature of the 
type I task which was a non-decision task by default and 
allowed manipulating only the cue of initiation / continuation 
of action. Type II sequencing, on the other hand, allowed 
manipulating both cues the initiation / continuation of action of 
Type I sequencing 
 
Type II sequencing 
 
 
Figure 1.  Sample tasks 
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action and the presence of action options. In this case, however, 
the design of the equidistant position of the dots at the decision 
level from the preceding dot placed the need to control the 
direction (left or right) of the movement under the non-decision 
condition resulting in larger number of type II sequencing 
tasks. The samples of type I sequencing tasks and type II 
sequencing tasks are given in figure 1. 
4) Force feedback 
In all tasks and during the whole task duration, the force 
feedback applied to the hand of the participant through the 
haptic device once the participant started moving the hand in 
space, was pushing the hand upward. The movement from all 
dots to all following dots, except for the movement from the 
second to the third dot, was accompanied by force feedback of 
0.9 N. The force feedback that accompanied the movement 
from the second to the third dot was 2N in all tasks. A sudden 
force change on the participant's hand was avoided by force 
acceleration by 3N/sec. and deceleration by 10N/sec. Such 
force feedback change that occurred in all tasks at the same 
dot-connection level, corresponded to the decision point in the 
decision tasks with two equally valid action options. This 
paradigm in which the bottom-up cues (force feedback change) 
were identical in all tasks, but the tasks were different with 
regard to top-down cues (presence of action options and 
perceived initiation of action) allowed testing 1) whether 
perceived initiation of action would override bottom up cues 
and influence sense of agency, and 2) whether the need for a 
decision would override bottom up cues and influence sense of 
agency. 
5) Agency measure 
The sense of agency was measured using direct questions 
about the experience of control.  After each of the 40 
completed tasks, the participant had to indicate the perceived 
degree of own control (SELF agency) and the perceived degree 
of control induced by the computer (COMP agency). 
Considering that the change in the force feedback was 
introduced in the middle of the task, two separate agency 
questions referring to the experience of control exerted by self 
(SELF agency) and control provided by the computer (COMP 
agency) were used to account for bi-directionality of the haptic 
system and the joint nature of the task. The answers to two 
agency questions were given on a 7-point Likert scale. 
B. Results 
1) Top-down cues and agency 
The main analysis was done on initiation vs. continuation 
of action and decision vs. non-decision conditions. Type I and 
type II tasks were analyzed separately which allowed 
eliminating the possible confounded top-down cue of the task 
difference perception. The results of the t-tests showed no 
significant difference in SELF agency between condition. 
There was also no significant difference in COMP agency 
between conditions (see Table 1). 
2) Consistency of agency 
In order to identify how consistent were SELF agency and 
COMP agency across the trials of the individual tasks two 
measures were used: standard deviation and entropy. The 
analysis of conditions with regard to standard deviation 
revealed no significant differences in standard deviations for 
SELF agency or COMP agency between initiation vs. 
continuation conditions and decision vs. non-decision 
conditions. No significant differences between SD for SELF 
agency on individual tasks and overall SD for SELF agency 
were found either. On the other hand, SD for task 1 (M=0.99, 
SD=0.57) and SD for task 7 (M=0.73, SD=0.41) for COMP 
agency were significantly different from the average standard 
deviation for all COMP agency (M=0.85, SD=0.37). SD for 
task 1 was higher than the average, t(15)=2.14, p<0.05, while 
SD for task 7 was lower than the average, t(15)=-2.19, p<0.05.  
The entropy measure for analysis of consistency of the 
sense of agency was also used. Entropy was calculated using:     
 
                               (1) 
 
where pi is the fraction of answers equal to i, for i 
=0,1,2,3,4,5,6, and t is the number of trials (t≤  5). The 
measure was normalized by ln t resulting in the maximum 
entropy of 1 for all cases. This includes the cases where one or 
two trials were excluded from the analysis because they were 
not finished according to the instruction. The analysis of 
conditions with regard to entropy revealed no significant 
differences in entropy for SELF agency or COMP agency 
between initiation vs. continuation conditions and decision vs. 
non-decision conditions. Paired-samples t-tests also showed no 
significant differences between SELF agency entropy on 
individual tasks and the average entropy on all SLEF agency 
tasks. However, in the case of COMP agency entropy, task 4 
entropy (M=0.55, SD=0.22) was significantly higher than the 
average entropy of all COMP agency tasks (M=0.49, 
SD=0.16), t(15)=2.20, p<0.05. Entropy averages on all tasks, 
except for average of SELF agency entropy for task 6 
(H=0.36), fall within the range between 0.41 - 0.75, which, in 
this case, corresponds to entropy range representing cases 
when only 3 out 5 judgments were the same, and only 2 out of 
4 judgments were the same in case of one invalid trial. 
TABLE I.  PAIRED SAMPLES T-TEST 
SELF agency t df 
Initiation vs. continuation (Type I) 0.87 15.00 
Initiation vs. continuation (Type II) -1.07 15.00 
Decision vs. non-decision (Type II) 1.26 15.00 
COMP agency t df 
Initiation vs. continuation (Type I) -.41 15.00 
Initiation vs. continuation (Type II) 0.58 15.00 
Decision vs. non-decision (Type II) -1.15 15.00 
 
3) Serial position of tasks and agency 
In order to explain the discrepancy of agency on the 
identical trials of the same task, the possibility of the effect of 
serial position of the trials of individual tasks within the 
randomized sequence of 40 trails was considered. The measure 
of adjusted average distance between consecutive trials on 
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individual tasks was used. Adjusted average distance was 
calculated using:                                                                                                                                        
                     
(2) 
 
where S1, S2,…., St are the serial numbers of trials per task 
sorted in increasing order and t is the number of trials. The 
square-root adjustment was used to give more weight to 
medium intervals. 
Further analysis comprised of several bivariate correlations 
to identify the relationship between SELF agency entropy, 
COMP agency entropy, standard deviations, and adjusted 
average distances was conducted. Significant correlations were 
found between adjusted average distances and standard 
deviations of SELF agency. There was a significant positive 
correlation between the standard deviation for task 2 and task 8 
and adjusted average distances for task 6, r=0.5, p<0.05 and 
r=0.54, p<0.05 respectively. Both correlations had a large 
effect size of equal or above 0.50 indicating that these variables 
covary strongly. A negative correlation between the standard 
deviation for task 3 and adjusted average distance for task 2 
was also found, r=-0.68, p<0.01. The effect size of this 
relationship is also large.  
In the case of COMP agency, positive correlations were 
found between adjusted average distance for task 6 and entropy 
for task 7, r=0.54, p<0.05, adjusted average distance for task 1 
and standard deviation for task 8, r=0.51, p<0.05. Negative 
correlations were found between adjusted average distance for 
task 6 and entropy for task 5, r=-0.55, p<0.05, adjusted average 
distance for task 5 and entropy for task 8, r=-0.51, p<0.05, and 
between adjusted average distance for task 5 and standard 
deviation for task 8, r=-0.50, p<0.05. All of the found 
relationships had large effect sizes with a correlation around 
0.5. 
The effect of training was checked by dividing the raw data 
into quartiles and comparing all possible pairs using a 
dependent t-test. No significant differences were found 
indicating no general effect of training on the performance. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The aim of the study was twofold. The first aim was to 
investigate the effect of two top-down cues (perceived 
initiation of action and presence of action options) on sense of 
agency in haptic interfaces. The second aim was to investigate 
the consistency of the sense of agency and answer the question 
whether consistent force feedback (bottom-up cue) is sufficient 
to grant stable experience of agency. 
The results of the present study showed that the 
investigated top-down cues had no effect on sense of agency. 
In case of the presence of action options, the results are both 
inconsistent with but can be explained on the basis of the 
results obtained in [22]. They found that the maximum number 
of action options was associated with stronger intentional 
binding pointing to the stronger self-agency, and the difference 
in binding in 7-key condition (maximum choice) was 
significantly higher in comparison to 1-key condition (no 
choice), but the differences between 7-key condition and 3-key 
condition as well as the differences between the 3-key 
condition and 1-key condition were non-significant. It is 
reasonable to assume that the effects of action options and the 
experience of choice are observed only under the conditions of 
relatively large number of action choices. In the present study, 
the participants had two options to choose from or no choice 
options; therefore, the effect of choice options was not found.  
With regard to the second top-down cue, the expectation 
was that the participants would experience more agency in the 
initiation of action condition because they performed the action 
on their own and they were the ones deciding when to start the 
task. In the case of continuation of action, not only did the 
participants continue the action initiated by the computer but 
they also could not decide on their own when to start as this 
was predetermined by the computer’s performance on the first 
part of the task. It is possible that the participants did not 
experience decreased agency because predetermined point of 
start was not perceived as a matter of less personal control but 
rather as an inherent element of the task being performed by 
two agents in which each agent has equal level of control. 
Therefore, a good framework to address these results would be 
joint agency. At this point we know very little about the 
dynamics of joint human-computer agency and the diversity of 
used paradigms makes it difficult to compare the results of the 
studies addressing the same issue; however, we do know that 
certain change in agency occurs when a computer partner is 
added. In their study on human-human and human-computer 
joint agency, [38] have noted that human-human performance 
was associated with immediate prereflective “we” agentic 
identify because intentional binding for action and its effect 
was present in human-human pairing regardless of who has 
generated an action. On the other hand, when a computer 
partner was added, implicit prereflective sense of agency, as 
measured by intentional binding, “broke down”, i.e. intentional 
binding did not occur in human-computer action even when 
explicit self-agency was present. In the present study, 
prereflective agency was not measured and, therefore, it is not 
known whether a similar dynamics of implicit/explicit agency 
occurred within the investigated case of joint human-computer 
agency; however, result from [38] give a convincing example 
of the possibility of change in the personal agency when the 
computer partner is added. Researchers [38] also propose that 
one of the criteria of forming ‘we’ identity for truly joint 
agency is the ability to represent the other agent’s task “in the 
same format as one’s own task and to comprehend that they 
have intentions to act that are similar to one’s own intentions” 
(p. 668). They also make a case for this criterion being met 
only in the human-human pairing condition in their 
experiment. If this criterion for joint agency to be accepted, it is 
possible that it was also met or partially met in the present case 
of human-computer pairing. This might be the case due to the 
joint nature of the task used. In the used paradigm, the 
participants had to finish the task initiated by the computer and 
the computer performed exactly the same kind of action as the 
participant which means the goal was shared and, therefore, the 
participants could have represented the task of the computer in 
the same format as own task. These give a good starting point 
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for investigation of joint human-computer agency from 
perspective of shared goal representation. 
The considerations of the type of joint task in order to 
explain the agency results could be also extended to the 
assumption that some aspects of the joint task might affect 
agency more than other aspects. For example, if we assume 
that agency is a process of weighted contributions from 
multiple sources of information, there might be a difference in 
the weight of task initiation and the weight of task completion, 
with task completion being more crucial to sense of agency 
than initiation. This means that even though the task was in fact 
accomplished jointly by the computer and the human, because 
the computer was always the first one to start and the 
participants were always the ones to finish the task in the 
continuation of action condition, the participants experienced 
agency due to their contribution at the final stage of the task 
which allowed achieving the goal shared by two agents. This 
hypothesis could be addressed in the future research by looking 
at the agency effects in case of human continuation and 
completion of the task initiated by the computer and in case of 
human initiation of the task continued and completed by the 
computer partner. Regardless of whether the above 
explanations are adopted, future research on joint human-
computer agency will need to take into consideration the types 
of joint tasks. In this study the participant needed to continue 
the task initiated by the computer. This case of human-
computer pairing presents a qualitatively different case of joint 
agency than the case presented in [38]. In their study, 
participants performed a simple action of taping on the touch 
pad and had to judge the time of the action onset or the onset of 
the tone that followed the action with a delay. This task was 
paired with the feedback on whether the person has tapped on 
the touch pad first and caused the tone or the confederate did 
(another person in human-human pairing and computer 
software in human-computer pairing). On the other hand, in the 
present study the human agent and the computer agent 
completed one task together by each contributing to one part of 
that task. In fact, the paradigm proposed here might qualify 
better for a joint agency framework than the one used in [38].  
The second aim of the study was to investigate consistency 
of the sense of agency and answer the question whether 
consistent force feedback (bottom-up cue) is sufficient to grant 
stable experience of agency. The overall experience of agency 
in this study was broken down into self-agency and computer-
attributed agency to account for bi-directionality of the haptic 
system and the joint nature of the task. The findings show that 
self-agency was relatively consistent while computer-attributed 
agency was much less consistent. These findings likely indicate 
that the participants were relatively certain about the amount of 
haptic effort they applied; however, they were more likely to 
doubt the intensity of the force feedback induced by the 
computer during the task performance. The inconsistency of 
evaluation of force feedback could be due to poor force 
feedback tracking during the task, and therefore, poor encoding 
of force feedback cues. The assumption of poor online force 
feedback tracking means that the nature of the task could have 
lowered the attention to the force feedback and, therefore, the 
sensitivity to changes in force feedback at the critical point in 
each task was diminished. Such explanation is well supported 
by the studies on inattentional blindness, and tactile 
inattentional blindness in particular. Tactile inattentional 
blindness typically takes a form of change blindness and refers 
to inability to detect change in tactile stimulation as a function 
of attentional processes (e.g., [39]). 
Alternatively, it is possible that online tracking of force 
feedback was accurate, however, relevant haptic 
representations faded quickly. Participants were given the task 
to connect the dots and were instructed and trained on how to 
do that using the haptic device; there was no task to keep a 
track of force feedback changes or the indication that this force 
feedback is important to the experiment. This was a crucial part 
of the used paradigm that allowed addressing the question of 
correspondence between the explicit force feedback judgment 
in JND experiments for haptic rendering and real experience 
with haptic displays that involves a task unrelated to explicit 
force evaluation. However, performance on the task unrelated 
to explicit force feedback evaluation might itself account for 
the fact that even if relevant force feedback representations 
were created in an online manner, the participants failed to 
achieve consistent agency due to fragile nature of these 
representations given participants’ unawareness of the 
significance of this information. This assumption can also be 
reframed as a possibility that online feeling of agency might 
have been accurate and it is the post-factum judgment of 
agency that became biased. A larger framework to view this 
result could be the contribution of time-linked cues to agency 
as opposed to cues that occur prior and after the action. At this 
point we know that all three types of cues are essential; 
however, the weighted contribution of these cues and the biases 
associated with the time course of the action remain an area for 
future exploration.  
The present study has also confirmed that information 
preceding the action, just as the time-linked cues, influences 
agency. The analysis showed that inconsistency of the 
perception of the force feedback can be partially explained by 
the position of trials of individual tasks within the sequence of 
40 randomized trials. Randomized presentation of trials 
allowed dealing with the direct sequence effect; however, it did 
not eliminate the sequence effect entirely. The proximity of 
trials of some tasks was related to biased sense of agency on 
others supporting the previous findings that situational 
information prior to action generation can influence the sense 
of agency and in override the bottom-up sensorimotor 
feedback.  
The above findings support the ecological approach to force 
feedback processing undertaken here, pointing to the fact that 
while explicit force feedback evaluation for haptic application 
design is informative in general, it, however, is not 
representative of the processing of such feedback in haptic 
interfaces that have a task other than force evaluation. Under 
the normal circumstances, the bottom-up cue of force feedback 
is coupled with a range of top-down cues that occur prior, at 
the time of and after the action has been generated. In the 
present study, the sequence of tasks was shown to have such 
effect, indicating that the information prior to action has 
influenced the interpretation of the force feedback. On the 
other hand, the effect of presence of action options and 
initiation vs. continuation of action did not have an effect on 
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the sense of agency in the used paradigm. There is a possibility 
that other top-down cues not measured here could offer a full 
explanation for inconsistency of agency. Considering that 
previous research has pointed to the possibility that 
expectations can be a powerful top-down cue that can modify 
an overall agency experience [40], expectations regarding the 
similarity or difference of experience might have also 
contributed to the instability of agency in the present study. 
Some of the limitations of the present study to be noted 
pertain to the measurement of agency. While participants were 
not asked to evaluate force feedback explicitly in order to see 
how this feedback is interpreted through the sense of agency 
we experience in any action, it could be argued that the explicit 
measure of agency or the reflective feedback measure used 
here is also non-typical to daily functioning, and that in a 
typical situation we are likely to experience the feeling of 
agency without creating a judgment about it. An extension of 
this argument noted above could be that the feeling of agency 
might have been accurate while the judgment of agency 
became biased. Most recent accounts, however, show that we 
rely on both the feeling of agency and the judgment of agency 
and the dynamics of the two is situational. We might also 
consider that in a relatively artificial and novel situation such 
as the haptic display interaction, we are in fact more likely to 
be more introspective and reflective and rely on the explicit 
judgment than the implicit feeling of agency that is typical to 
familiar situations. The future research might address the issue 
of agency in haptic displays employing both reflective 
feedback measures of judgment of agency and implicit 
measures of feeling of agency (e.g., intentional binding). 
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